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against a stevedore whose breach of the warranty of workmanlike per­
formance, implicit in the stevedoring contract, resulted in injuries for 
which the shipowner was held liable. Its purpose was to make the 
party responsible for the injuries pay for the result of its negligence. 
But while the court noted that the Ryan doctrine might no longer be 
valid, (in light of the adoption by a number of circuits of the policy of 
apportioning liability according to the comparative fault of each party 
as opposed to following indemnity principles espoused in Ryan), the 
court did point out that it was unnecessary to decide its validity 
because Selvick's claim fell outside the scope of Ryan. The warranty 
runs against the stevedore, not against the cargo owner who had mere­
ly hired the stevedore, and in this case Selvick was suing the cargo 
owner, Valders, and not the stevedore, Strauss. 
The court also rejected Selvick's claim that it was an intended ben­
eficiary of the stone supply contract between Valders and C-Way. 
Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, sees. 302, 304 
(1981), the court held that Selvick was only an incidental beneficiary 
and, therefore, not entitled to damages from Valders. Finally, as 
Selvick was unable to produce any evidence to substantiate its claim 
as an intended beneficiary to the contract, the court held that Valders 
was accountable only to C-Way for any breach caused by the alleged 
negligence of Strauss. 
Stephen W. Beyer '92 
HINES V. BRITISH STEEL CORPORATION 
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 23 July 1990 
907 F.2d 726 
Absent an express contractual provision to supervise stevedoring operations, a time charterer has no general duty to do so, and is not liable 
under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act for the injuries or death of a longshoreman arising out of such operations. 
FACTS: On October 3, 1987, Clark Hines (Hines), a longshoreman 
who was employed by Ceres Terminals, Inc. (Ceres), was killed while 
performing stevedoring duties aboard the M.S. Ravenna (the 
Ravenna). British Steel Corporation (BSC) had time chartered the 
Ravenna from its owner, Roscoe Shipping, S.A., and had docked the 
vessel in Chicago on October 1, 1987 to unload a cargo of steel. The 
master and the crew of the Ravenna were employees of Roscoe 
Shipping. 
Just prior to the accident, the steel had been completely unloaded 
from the Ravenna. Hines and other Ceres employees were clearing 
dunnage (pieces of lumber used to protect cargo during transport) out 
of the ship's holds. Captain Tore Sorenson, a Ceres superintendent, 
was in charge of the stevedoring operations aboard the Ravenna. At 
the time of the accident, BSC's cargo representative, John Folan, was 
not on board the vessel. 
An unused bundle of dunnage was secured with Ceres owned 
slings to one of the ship's cranes. The crane operator then improperly 
swung the loaded crane over the open hatch of the hold in which the 
men were working. Swinging a loaded crane over an open hatch while 
men are working below is a forbidden activity and Ceres crane opera­
tors are instructed not to do so. For no discernible reason, the bundle 
of dunnage fell from the crane and struck a dumpster in the hold. The 
bundle broke apart, and pieces of flying dunnage struck Hines, who 
later died. 
Rachelle Hines, wife of the decedent, brought this action as special 
administrator of his estate under the Longshore and Harbor Workers 
(LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §905 (b), against BSC to recover damages for 
her husband's death. She filed the suit in the Circuit Court of Cook 
County, Illinois, but BSC removed it to the United States District 
Court for the Northern District Of Illinois. BSC then moved for sum­
mary judgment on the grounds that it had no general duty to supervise 
stevedoring operations aboard the Ravenna. The plaintiff asserted that 
the various agreements BSC made with Ceres and Roscoe Shipping 
showed a clear intent by BSC to control Ceres unloading operations. 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of BSC, 
fmding that BSC was amenable to suite under the LHWCA but con­
cluding that the Supreme Court decision in Scindia Steam Navigation 
Co., Ltd. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981) precluded a finding 
that BSC had a general duty to oversee Ceres operations. The court 
found that the language of the charter party, together with Captain 
Sorenson's testimony that Folan took no part in the actual stevedoring 
operations, indicated that BSC had no special duty to ensure the safe­
ty of the longshoremen. Rachelle Hines appealed the decision. 
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ISSUE: Did BSC, a time charterer, owe a duty to Ceres, an indepen­
dent stevedoring contractor, to supervise the stevedoring operations 
aboard the Ravenna? 
ANALYSIS: In Scindia, the Supreme Court interpreted the vessel's 
duty to inspect or supervise the stevedore's cargo operations under the 
1972 amendments to 33 U.S.C. 905(b) as nonexistent. The court held 
that a shipowner "is not liable to longshoremen for injuries caused by 
dangers unknown to him." Although Scindia involved a shipowner 
and not a time charterer, the principles discussed there apply with 
equal force to the present case. 
In this case, the crane was in good working condition, the danger­
ous act of the crane operator was unforeseeable, and the BSC cargo 
representative was not on board the vessel at the time of the accident. 
Under these conditions, the court found, BSC is not liable pursuant to 
Scindia, absent an express contractual agreement. Appellant argued 
that BSC contractually undertook control of the stevedoring opera­
tions and therefore had a duty of care to the Ceres employees under 
Restatement of Torts (Second) 414. The court noted that the com­
ments to Section 414 suggest that the right to make recommendations, 
to inspect, and to order work stopped or resumed is not enough to 
constitute retention of control, and that there must be a retention such 
that the stevedore cannot do the work in his own manner. The court 
also noted that few courts have applied Section 414 in the context of a 
lawsuit under Section 904(b) of the LHWCA, but the Supreme Court 
in Scindia recognized the Restatement as a useful analytical tool. 
However, the court also remarked that Section 414 does not address 
the contractual relationship between BSC and Roscoe Shipping. 
Accordingly, it is applicable only to the various agreements between 
BSC and Ceres. Since BSC did not retain the requisite degree of con­
trol of stevedoring operations outlined in Section 414, no duty is 
imposed on BSC by this section. 
Appellant further argued that clause 8 of the charter agreement 
between BSC and Roscoe Shipping, together with paragraph "j" of 
BSC's instructions to the ship's Master, gave BSC control over the 
discharging of the cargo. Paragraph "j" gave BSC the right to appoint 
a stevedore, who was to remain under the direct control of the ship's 
Master. Clause 8 of the charter party provided in relevant part that the 
captain would be under the orders of BSC and that BSC was to "load, 
stow, trim and discharge the cargo at its own expense but such 
stowage shall be conducted by and under the control of the Master 
and the Owners shall be responsible for the proper stowage and cor­
rect delivery of the cargo." The court observed that clause 8 is a stan-
dard provision in a charter party. Spence v. Mariehamns RIS, 766 F.2d 
1504 (11th Circ. 1985). But, the court stated, the amended part of 
clause 8 included in the charter party between BSC and Roscoe 
Shipping did not place the responsibility of proper discharge of cargo 
on BSC. lrby v. Tokai Lines, 1990 WL 18880, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
2116 (E.D.PA. Feb 23, 1990). 
The court concluded that the plain language of clause 8 contained 
no suggestion that BSC had a duty to supervise, and that the appeiJant 
failed to present any extrinsic proof that BSC and Roscoe Shipping 
meant to impose such a duty. Therefore, the court rejected Mrs. 
Hines' contention that clause 8 was an agreement between the parties 
placing the responsibility for the safety of the longshoremen during 
cargo operations on BSC. 
AppelJant's fmal argument was that BSC had such control over the 
stevedoring operations as to raise a duty on BSC's behalf to ensure the 
safety of Ceres employees. She calJed attention to the right of BSC's 
cargo representative to be present during the discharging of cargo, his 
right to make suggestions, and to the ten pages of instructions on 
proper handling of BSC cargo given to Ceres. The court concluded 
that Folan merely regulated the proper handling of BSC cargo so as to 
avoid any damage to it, and that the ten pages of instructions were 
simply a "laundry list" of suggestions on how to handle the various 
products BSC ships. BSC in fact retained no actual control over the 
stevedoring operations. Therefore, no duty could be imposed on BSC 
to ensure the safety of the longshoremen. 
As the depositions of Sorenson and Folan support the finding that 
BSC was not in any way involved in the operative control of the 
stevedoring operations, and as Sorenson testified that the responsibili­
ty to ensure the safety of his workers was his own, the Court of 
Appeals found no general duty, under Scindia, for BSC to supervise 
stevedoring operations, and no contractual agreements imposing such 
a duty. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court 
granting summary judgment in favor of BSC. 
Katherine Vasilopoulos '92 
AFRAM LINES INTERN., INC. V. M/V CAPETAN YIANNIS 
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, 19 June 1990 
905 F.2d 347 
Absent extraordinary circumstances, plaintiff need not post countersecurity in amounts exceeding the security of the original claim when 
the plaintiff does not seek to release its property from the counterplaintitT's custody and when the counterplaintitT cannot proceed in rem 
or quasi in rem. 
FACTS: In December, 1987 Brotherhood Shipping Company, Ltd. 
(Brotherhood), owner of the M/V Capetan Yiannis (the vessel) 
entered an agreement with a nonparty, Grant Shipping Company, and 
Afram Lines International, Inc. (Afram), a Florida corporation. Under 
the agreements the vessel was to be subchartered to Afram and was to 
carry cargo for Afram from Milwaukee, Wis., to West Africa. The 
vessel would be commanded by a Brotherhood employee. 
On December 12, 1987 the parties took the vessel to the port of 
Milwaukee and began to load cargo. On December 14, the harbormas­
ter issued a notice to alJ affected vessels of an impending storm. After 
allegedly receiving ambiguous advice from Afram's Milwaukee rep­
resentative, the vessel master decided to keep the vessel tied to the 
dock. During the storm the vessel's mooring lines split and the vessel 
was pushed repeatedly against the dock causing both vessel and dock 
substantial structural damage. 
Afram promptly filed an action in the Eastern District of Wisconsin 
seeking recovery in rem against the vessel and in personam from 
Brotherhood for S1.7 million in damages for Brotherhood's alleged 
negligence, conversion, and breach of the subcharter agreement. In 
response to Afram's demand of security Brotherhood agreed with 
Afram to post a $440,000.00 bank guarantee, thereby avoiding arrest 
of the vessel. 
Afram then instituted an action in the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Florida. Brotherhood filed an answer and a 
counterclaim. The counterclaim alleged that Brotherhood had sus­
tained damages in the amount of $4,724,475.74 which was 
attributable to Afram's own conduct. After filing the answer and 
counterclaim Brotherhood filed a motion pursuant to Rule E(7) of the 
Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims 
(Rule E(7)), to compel Afram to post countersecurity. The district 
court granted the motion and ordered Afram to post security to the 
full stated amount of Brotherhood's claim. Afram filed a motion for 
reconsideration, which was denied. Afram appealed the decision to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 
ISSUE: Did the district court err in ordering the plaintiff to post 
countersecurity in amounts exceeding the security of the original 
claim when the plaintiff did not, by posting countersecurity, seek to 
release its property from the counterplaintiff's custody and when the 
counterplaintiff could not bring an action in rem or quasi in rem? 
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated 
the order of the district court, fmding that the district court had abused 
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its discretion in requiring Afram to post the sum. 
In its decision the court looked first at Rule E(7). The court found 
that the rule stands for the proposition that in the event of a counter­
claim, where the defendant had given security to respond in damages, 
the plaintiff shall give security in the usual amount and form to 
respond in damages to the claims found in the counterclaim, unless 
the court, for cause shown, otherwise directs. The purpose of the rule, 
the court noted, is to "place the parties on an equality as regards to 
security." 
Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia 
Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629, 638-39 (1924). The court further found 
that to effectuate Rule E(7) the district court has broad discretion to 
determine whether, and to what amounts, countersecurity shall be 
posted. 
Despite this broad discretion, the court stated that the district court 
should consider several factors. For example, it should be reluctant to 
order countersecurity if the plaintiff does not, by the posting of coun­
tersecurity, seek to release its property from the counterplaintiff's cus­
tody. Expert Diesel, Inc. v. The Yacht "Fishin' Fool", 627 F. Supp. 
432 (S.D.Fla.l986). The court also held that it should be determined 
whether the counterplaintiff could have brought an action in rem or 
quasi in rem for in the event that the counterplaintiff could not have 
proceeded in this manner, there would be little reason to require a 
larger bond on the counterclaim than on the original claim. In addi­
tion, the court held that the district court should look at the plaintiff's 
financial ability to post the countersecurity. Finally, the court held, it 
should be considered to what extent the counterclaim may be 
frivolous. 
Applying the facts, the court of appeals concluded that Afram did 
not seek to release any of its property form Brotherhood's custody by 
posting countersecurity. It also found that Brotherhood could not pro­
ceed in rem or quasi in rem and that Brotherhood sought its recovery 
from Afram in personam. With these two factors present, the court 
ruled that district courts should not, absent extraordinary circum­
stances, require claimants, like Afram, to post countersecurity in an 
amount which exceeds the security posted on the original claim. Thus 
the court held that the district court had abused its discretion when it 
ordered Afram to post full countersecurity. 
John Froitzheim '92 
